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ABSTRACT
An issue confronting U.S. policymakers is whether restrictions on securities
activities of U.S. commercial banks ought to be abolished within a broader
program of banking and financial market deregulation. The Euro—bond market offers
an opportunity to examine the performance of a largely unregulated securities
market and the behavior of U.S. commercial bank affiliates within that market.
In this paper, we present evidence on the development and performance of the
Euro—bond market over the last 20 years and then infer the likely consequences if
a similar level of deregulation and competition were permitted in the United States.
Data on the level of competition is presented along with an analysis of
underwriting strategies and innovations that have been pursued in the market.
The most serious criticisms concerning Euro-bond market operations--e.g. excessive
spreads, conflicts of interest, and the Grey market--are reviewed.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the Euro-bond market has experienced
dynamic and vigorous growth, resulting in net benefits to both borrowers and
lenders without exposing the financial instituitons to significant risks. Large
U.S. companies regularly tap the Euro—bond market and capture some of these
benefits. Allowing U.S. commercial bank affiliates to compete in the U.S. securities
markets could make these benefits more certain and expand their availability to








A major question facing U.S. policymakers today is whether exist-
ing restrictions on securities acitivities of U.S. commercial banks ought
to be abolished as part of a broader program of banking and financial
market deregulation, or whether policymakers should preserve the status
quo. In the discusion of this issue, two points are often forgotten:
(a) An essentially unregulated securities market, the Eurobond
market, has existed for over 20 years, and
(b) U.S. commercial bank affiliates have been important partici-
pants in the Euro-bond market and --wherethey are permitted
to do so --inforeign securities markets as well.
Thishistorical experience suggests that itmay be appropriate to examine
thebehavior of international capital markets, and to ascertain what les-
sons, ifany, they hold for financialderegulation in the United States.
The purpose of this paper is to offer a contribution to the
debateon deregulation of investment banking activities by drawing on the
experiencein international capital markets. The evidence we present
addresses two broad sets of issues:—2—
(1) [s it possible for private agents to organize the underwriting
of securities, issuing and dealing functions in an efficient
mannerwithout restricting competitive forces ?
(2) Does the presence of agents (i.e. commercial banks)who engage
inrelated financial transactions (e.g. accepting deposits,
lending,managing trust funds, etc.) have any adverse effects
on the underwriting and issuing markets, on related financial
transactions (e.g. unbiased credit evaluations) or on the basic
safetyand soundness of the banking system ?
One major segment of the international capital market, the Euro—bond
market,is ourlaboratory for exploring question one. The Euro-bond market,
althoughnot entirely free of regulation, operates under substantially
fewerrestrictions than those placed on domestic and foreign bond issues.
In particular, there are no regulatory restrictions on firms wishing to
engagein underwriting or dealing activities. Onlyeconomic factors—-
adequatefinancial capital, human capital and appropriate technology--make
it costly for firms toenter (orleave) the Euro-bond market.
TheEuro-bond market may thus be studied as an example of how
well the underwriting and issuing functions of a primary market are per-
formed in an environment that is largely unregulated and open to competi-
tive forces. Certain characteristics of the market-—the concentration of
underwriters, the allegiance of issuers to underwriters, the cost of
underwriting services, and the cost of funds to issuers——might be taken as
a standard of comparison against other markets.—3-
In addressing the second question, the Euro-bond market again
offers a potentially useful source of evidence. Major foreign banks and
offshore subsidiaries of US. bank holding companies compete head—to-head
with more specialized investment banking or issuing houses. It will gen-
erally be the case that the major foreign and U.S. commercial banks will
offer related financial services to corporate issuers and a fiduciary
responsibility toward other bank customers. Consequently, these banks may
be thought to be more exposed to problems of conflict of interest and abuse
of fiduciary trust than may be the case with more specialized issuing
houses. The record of the Euro-bond market is open to examination in this
regard.
The second question might also be approached in another manner,
by analyzing the primary issue markets in countries other than the United
States. In many industrial countries commercial banking and investment
banking are not formally separated, and commercial banks are not prohibited
2
from underwriting corporate securities, including equities. These foreign
market settings offer another opportunity to analyze whether the combina-
tion of commercial and investment banking within one financial institution
allows for a smoothly functioning primary issue market in which potential
conflict of interest problems are manageable and public confidence in the
.3
safety and soundness of banks is maintained.
However, because of the great differences in macroeconomic poli-
cies, fiscal incentives and the institutional environment, we will argue
that the experience with combined commercial and investment banking outside
the United States is less relevant for our study. Indeed it will be argued
that the thrust of regulation itself is fundamentally different in other
industrial countries than in the United States.9—4—
Consequently, we propose to focus on the Euro-bond market as an
arena in which both of our above research questions can be addressed. The
Euro—bondmarket is, first, an example of a largely unregulated market and
second, a market in which institutions take on underwritingand investment
banking duties in addition to their commercial banking functions. We pro-
pose thatthe analysis of the Euro—bond market, in general, and the role
played by banking institutions, in particular, is directly relevant for
assessing the implications of expanding competition in the United States by
allowingseparately capitalized securities affiliates of commercial banks
to engage in investment banking activities.
Our methodolgy is not that of formal hypothesis testing. Rather,
we claimthat the Euro—bond market and the U.S. corporate securities mark-
ets arecomparable in the sense that our findings concerning the degree of
compeAtion or advantages to borrowers and lenders might apply equally to
5
U.S.securities markets were the Glass-Steagall act abolished. Our
approach, therefore, is to appraise the overall development and success of
the Euro—bond market with its attendant problems and risks. We then attempt
to infer what lessons there are in this experience for deregulation of U.S.
financial markets.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the Euro-bond
market has indeed "succeeded" in the sense that the market can survive
without artificial support and continues to fulfill the very real demands
of both borrowers and lenders. In the early years, the market enjoyed "pro-
tection" because of U.S. policies that pushed borrowers offshore. Still,
fixed income securities underwriting could hardly be labelled risk—free in
the post—Bretton Woods decade. Demand for Euro—bond issues fluctuated with
both exchange rate and interest rate expectations. To protect their—5—
interests while developing the market, underwriters adopted a variety of
protective measures --e.g.dealing with AAA clients to minimize credit
risks; establishing large syndicates to spread underwriting risks; setting
transaction costs high enough to provide an adequate cushion; and estab—
lishirig "grey markets" to minimize the price risk of unsold securities.
In addition, our analysis suggests that if the United States
allows commercial banking and investment banking activities to take place
withing the context of a single bank holding company, the result will not
be a system of "universal banks" that resembles those existing in Europe.
This is because the concentration in the banking industry is, and is likely
to remain, far less in the United States than in Europe, the linkages
between corporations and banks are weaker in the Unites States than in
Europe, and the thrust of regulation is vastly dissimilar. Furthermore, if
the U.S. commercial banks were permited to engage in investment banking
activities, they would do so within the framework of regulations to estab-
lish minimum capital requirements for the new banking activities, and to
insure adequate separation of personnel and organization between commercial
and investment banking activitiesYAs a result, only a minority of the
nations 14,000 commercial banks would qualify to establish investment
banking operations.
Evidience from the Euro—bond market strongly suggests that, within
its essentially unregulated environment with no artificial barriers to
entry, underwriters have indeed behaved prudently, They organized a market,
allowing substantial benefits to both borrowers and lenders, without incur-
ring substantial risks. The evidence offers strong reason to believe that
U.S. commercial bank holding companies could likewise behave prudently in
competition with U.S. investment banking houses without undermining the-6—
basic safety and soundness of the system. Regulation and supervision of
commercial bank-related corporate securities underwriting and dealing
activities would establish minimum capital requirements, adequate disclo-
sure of information, and sufficient separation from commercial banking
operations. The increased competition would in all liklihood result in sig-
nificant net benefits to the economy at a minimal increase in risk to
society.
The plan for the paper is as follows. In Section II, we present
background information on the Euro—bond market. The evidence clearly shows
thatthe Euro-bond market is a major financial market offering a variety of
advantagesover domestic markets for both borrowers and lenders. An
appraisal of the underwriting stategies and competitive characteristics in
the Euro-bond market is offered in Section III. The evidence presented here
on industry concentration and switching among lead managers, suggests
greater competition in the Euro—bond market than in U.S. corporate
underwriting. In Section IV,weidentify some of the problems and risks
that have been associated with Euro—bond market operations and review some
of the corrective steps and innovations that have taken place to deal with
them. The scope for transplanting the spirit of Euro—bond market competi-
tion is explored in Section V. A summary and conclusions follow in Section
VI.II. BackgroundInformation on the Euro-bond Market
The purpose of this section is to describe the important operat-
ing characteristics of the Euro-bond market, and to present a variety of
statistical data indicating the size and scope of the market. We intend to
show that the Euro-bond market is indeed a major financial market, and that
our later findings concerning the behavior of underwriters and investment
bankers in this market may be indicative of behavior in othermajor markets
such as the United States, were it to allow securities affiliates of com-
mercial banks to compete in the financial services industry.
Citing World Bank records, Mendelsohn (1980, p.137) reports that
the first Euro—bond was issued in 1957 for Petrofina S.A., the Belgian
petroleum company. The issue was denominated in U.S. dollars in the amount
S
of $5,000,000. In 1982, the total of new Euro—bond issues surpassed $50
billion. Individual-9-
issues have sometimes exceeded $500 million.10 By comparison, total
bond issues in the United States by private institutions totalled
$53.4 billion in 1982. Public government issuesraised another $324.9
billion.
The Petrofina issue illustrates the two key features of a
Euro-bond. A Euro-bond is (1) underwritn by an international
syndicate, arid (2) offered for sale simultaneously in a number of
countries. As a consequence of (2), the issue is usually denominated
in a currency (or unit of account) that is foreign to a large num-
ber of the buyers. Mendelsohn (1983, pp. 4-5) points out that with
the introduction of the "bought deal", in which a single underwriter
commits to an entire issue in advance, the first of these dimensions
of a Euro-bond may be lost as a distinctive feature of Euro-bond
issues.
In contrast, a foreign bond is an obligation of a foreign com-
pany that is underwritten by a syndicate of domestic banks, denomin-
ated in domestic currency and offered for sale in the domestic
market. Examples of foreign bonds are Yankee bonds, dollar obli-
gations of non-U.S. firms underwritten and issued in the United
States, and Samurai bonds, yen obligations of non-Japanese firms
underwritten and issued in Japan.
Table 1 presents data on the yearly flow of international
bond issues. On average, the share of iuro-bonds and foreign bonds
in the market is roughly equal. The average annual growth rate of
Euro-bond issues over the period 1970-1981 was 22%. Many of the im-
portant characteristics of the various bond issues are displayed
for comparison in Table 2.Foreign
—10—
Table 1
INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES, 1970-1981
Foreign








































































































Average12,3617,344 4,46824,17451.1 30.418.5 100.0—11—
We wish to focus our attention next on differences in regula—
tory treatment and issuing costs, factors that ought to influence
the propensity of borrowers and lenders to converge on a particular
market. We have been careful not to suggest that the Euro-bond
market operates in a climate free from all regulation. While there
is no official regulation of the Euro-bond market se, every
Euro-bond issue "must conform with the laws and regulations of the
country in which it is offered for sale".12 However, this does not
mean meeting local requirements for public offerings. For example,
Euro-bonds may be offered for sale initially in the United States
if they are registered with the SEC under the 1933 Act. Most
Euro-bonds are not registered under the 1933 Act, but they can still
be sold in the United States after distribution abroad has been
completed, and they have been seasoned in the secondary market for
90 days.13 In practice, many foreign countries apply less restrictive
regulations than exist in the United States, or apply fewer restric-
tions on Euro-bonds than on domestic bonds. In all cases, the
method of offering Euro-bonds allows them not to be classified as
"public offerings", and they are, therefore, not national securities
subject to regulation.1
Since Euro-bonds are issued under minimal formal regulatory
control, the issuer avoids the kind of detailed and standardized
disclosure requirements that are part of U.S. bond issues. Docu-
ment preparation can be costly for U.S. issurers in the domestic
capital market, but it may be prohibitive for non-U.S. firms in
cases where accounting statements are not in accordance with Ameri-
can principles or where there is great reluctance to release certain—12—
Table2 -COMPARATIVECHARACTERISTICS OF BOND ISSUES
IN INTERNATIONAL BOND MARKETS
DomesticBonds Foreign Bonds Euro-bond Market
___________________(U.S.Market) non-U.S. Market)___________________
1.Regulatory bodies Securities and Exchange Official agency Minimum regulatory
Commission approval control
2. Disclosure More d2tailed Variable Determined by
requirements -higher initial expense markets practice
-higher ongoingexpense
—may be onerous to non—
U.S. firms.
3. Issuing costs 0.75 -1.0$ Variable to 4.0% 2.0 -2.5%
4.Rating required Yes Usually not No
5. Listing Listing separate Listing usual Listing usual
6. Queuing No formal queue Jsually queue No queue
7. Currency of U.S. does not restrictany foreign No restrictions on
denomination use of $. countries(Germaiy, U.S., and
Switzerland) Canadian $. estrictuse, pait
)f queuing.
8.Speed Relatively slow (ariable Jsually fast -Rule415 may speed -"Boughtdeal"
up process.
9.Borrower/IssuerLarger market, ocal visibility ower annual interest incentives greater depth )iversification expense.
Disclosure may be costly f sources 3peed of placement to





10. Lender/InvestorGreater depth and urrencydiver-urrency gains.
incentives, liquidity. ification gainearer bonds.
More standardized infor- o withholding tax matioridisclosed. n interest.
Source: Adapted from VanAgtmael(1983), p. 5.-13-
types ofinformation to the public. Euro-bonds areveryoften ex-
change-listed(in Luxembourg, London or Singapore), and therefore,
disclosure requirements must conform to exchange practices in those
financial centers. Exchange listing is mainly a cosmetic device to
increase the marketability of bonds amonginstitutionsand is not
a necessary feature of Euro-bonds. In practice, very few secondary
market transactions take place on the exchanges.15 Regulation,
therefore, is largely absent.
Unlike bond issues in the United States, the timing of domestic
and foreign issues abroad is generally controlled by the local
regulatory body.16 Queuing of new issues is an important tool of
macroeconomic policy outside the United States. In this manner,
governments seek to avoid "congestion' in the capital market, achieve
interest rate targets, allocate places in the queue according to
national economic or sectional priorities, and allow the government
a clear run at local capital markets.
Although it is claimed that queuing regulations do not operate
in the Euro—bond market, in fact this is only true in the U.S. and
Canadiandollar segments ofthe market. In othermarkets, notably
Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium, the authorities do infact regu-
/8
late the issuance of Euro—bonds denominated in domestic currency.
Again, these rules reflect the operation of macroeconomic policy
within a small, open economy in which policyrnakers attempt to manage
their exchange rate as well as interest rates. For domestic authori-
ties, control over the volume of offshore issues denominated in do-
mestic currency is important for achieving exchange rate and interest
rate targets. Presumably, authorities could prohibit domestic salesof anyunauthorizedissue, which would effectively kill the market
for it. Only the United States and Canada do not place restrictions
on the use of their currencies for Euro-bonds. Mendelsohn (1980
p. 139)argues,therefore, that only the U.S. and Canadian dollar
segments of the market are"true"Euro-bonds reflecting pure market
forces.
Because of these regulatory differences, a Eurodollar bond
issue can usually be organized and placed more quickly than a com-
parable U.S. domestic market issue. SEC Rule 415, permitting shelf
registration, has reduced the time necessary to launch a U.S. domes-
tic issue, but the advantage still resides with the Euro-bond market,
especially in the case of a "bought deal". Speed allows the is-
suer the benefit of seizing favorable "windows" when interest rates
are viewed as being unusually low.
Gross spreads in Euro-bond issues appear to be relatively high
when compared to the U.S. domestic market, but moderate to low in
comparison with other European markets (See Table 6, below). It is
generally agreed that the selling concession built into Euro-bonds
is relatively high, and that this plays an important role in pri-
marymarketpricing--as we shall discuss in Sections III and IV.
Offsetting the high spreads, annual interest expense is generally
lower in the Euro—bond market than in domestic markets. Theaverage size of
this interest differential is difficult to measure but, inMay 1982, the
yield advantage of the Euro-bond market to U.S. borrowers was roughly 75
2i basispoints for a five—year issue. Investorshavebeen willing to pay a
higherprice for Euro-bonds than, for example, comparable domestic bonds of
the same U.S.firm becauseEuro-bonds are generally issued in bearer form, and
thereare no taxes wihheld on interest payments. Recent U.S. legislation has
removed the 30% withholding tax on new issues of government and corporate bonds-15-
sold to foreigners. This new development, plus the the possibility that U.S.
Treasury securities may once again be issued in bearer form, may pose a
considerable challenge to the Euro-bond market. However, historically, the
actual cost of funds has been lower in either the Euro-bond market or domestic
capital markets depending on prevailing conditions.
The overall growth in yearly Euro-bond issues is pointed out
in Table 1. It is important to highlight other key dimensions of
the market. Table 3 shows the breakdown of Euro-bond issuers. Al-
most half of all issues were by governments, state enterprises
or international organizations. U.S. companies were responsible
for 13.5% of all issues. The distribution of Euro-bond issues by
currency of denomination is reported in Table14 Overall, the Euro-
dollar segment accounts for two-thirds of the market, but there is
considerable variation from year to year. In 1978, when the dollar
wasdeclining sharply on foreign exchange markets, the Eurodollar
segment was 51.6% of the market. In 1981, with foreign exchange
conditions reversed, the Eurodollar share reached 85%.Theaverage
sizefor new Eurodollar issues exceeds $70 million, slightly larger
than for non-dollar denominated issues. Secondary market trading
in Euro-bonds has grown simultaneously with new issue volume, as
illustrated in Table 5. The average maturities for new Euro-bond
issues is plotted in Figure 1. The general trend for maturities is
clearly downward reflecting the increase in risks associated with
interest rate and exchange rate volatility.Table 3 EUROBOND ISSUES, 1972-1981
. Value (in millions) Percentage
U.S. companies US$19,088 13.5
Non-U.S. companies 52,855 37.3
State enterprises 35777 25.2
Governments 20,743 14.6
International organizations 13,266 9.4





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sources: Years 1972-1980 arefrom Fisher (1980,













Note: Total excludes the majority of Deutsche mark denominated





TRADING VOLUME, 1972-1982 (billionequivalent)
p. 177).-19-
GROWTH OF EURODOLLAR BOND ISSUE SIZE, 1963-80 (averageissue amount
$million)
Sour lnter-',ond Services Ltd.
—I'i gj
GROWTH IN EUROBOND ISSUE SIZE, 1963-80 (average issueamount
$millionequivalent
4
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III.Appraising the Performance of the Euro-bond Market
In this section we offer an anlysis of the performance of the
Euro-bond market as an institution. We begin by describing the
initial conditions when the first Euro-bond issues were launched.
A discussion of strategic steps taken by Euro—bond underwriters in
order to develop the market follows, and we then assess the cornpe-
titive conditions that have resulted in Euro-bond underwriting.
Economic Policies and Eurornarkets in 1963
As noted earlier, the first Euro—bond issue occurred in 1957. Over $500
22
million was raised through 22 Euro—bond issues over the period 1957—1962.
Around this time, the Eurocurrency market --theoffshore market for
short-term loans and deposits -—wastaking shape. Given the large
share of international transactions denominated in dollars, itwas
reasonableto predict that non-Americans would soon demand longer-term
offshore assets denominated in dollars, as well as Eurocurrency de-
posits. Whilenatural forces were in place, the development of the
Euro-bond market was enhanced by the enactment of the Interest
Equalization Tax in the United States on July 18, 1963.23 The lET
was proposed as a temporary measure to reduce U.S. capital outflows
and take pressure off the U.S. balance of payments deficit. The lET
operated like an excise tax on American purchases of new or outstanding
foreign stocks and bonds. To no one's surprise, the lET effectively
closed the Yankee bond market; to the surprise of some, the foreign
borrowers simply migrated offshore to London and Luxembourg.2 A
secondmajor stimulus to the development of the Euro-bond market was
theimposition of the Office of Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI)- 20a-
controlsonU.S.multinationals financing of their overseas ventures,.
The controls began in February 1965ona voluntary basis and were made
mandatory in January 1968 to reduce U.S. capital outflows and improve
the balance of payments. By 1968, the OFDI controls effectively forced
U.S. multinationals offshore to meet their financing needs for foreign
projects.
Both the lET and OFDI controls were extended several times until
January197L. when both were scrapped. In 197L, with both foreign
borrowers and U.S. multinationals free to use U.S. capital markets,
the volumeof Euro-bondissues fell to $2.1 billion, its low for the
decade. However, volume has been rising sharply and more or less
steadily ever since.
The Euro-bond market has survived and prospered
because it satisfies economic demands that are not fulfilled by other
markets. Earlier, it was suggested that some demand for Euro-bonds
is natural since many non-Americans desire to issue or hold dollar-
denominated securities, Demand was increased further because securities sold by
U.S. companies domestically are generally in registered form, and until July
1984, the United States applied a 30% withholding tax on interest payments
to foreigners. One could also argue that for somegroups of borrowers
(e.g., large, well known firms) and investors (e.g., large, well in—
formed), domestic security market regulations represent a disincentive
that can be reduced with little risk by taking transactions offshore.25
Fisher (1981, p. 19) notes with appropriate irony that the U.S. lET
controls,"intentionally prejudicial" to non-American borrowers, ulti-
mately led to the "largest international capital market the world has
known". The 1963_7L1. period of relative protection was essential for— 21—
Euro-marketparticipants to develop professional relationshipsamong
themselves, client relationships with issuers, as well as the issuing
techniques appropriate to the new market.26 However, it would be a
mistake to assume that the Euro-bond market developed ina risk-free
environment. As in any securities market, interest-rate and credit
uncertainties led to investment and underwriting risks. Inaddition,
the unitofaccount for most Euro-bonds was foreign to most investors,
and so underwritersfacedthe risk that demand for bonds would shift
becauseofunexpected exchange rate movements. As we have seen (Table 4)
investorsweremore willing,to accumulate an issue if the unit
of account wasexpectedto appreciate. Existing Euro-bond underwriters
alwaysfaced the risk that the lET would be scrapped, and in 1974,
when the lET was finally eliminated and OFDI controlswere phased-
out, Euro-bond market volume collapsed to one-third the level of
1972 (Table 1). Finally, as there were no regulatory barriers to
entry, existing underwriters have faced the risk of entry by new
competitors. And as we have seen, this competitionmay also come from the U.S.
domestic market now that withholding taxeson interest payments to foreigners
have been abolished.— 22 -
Strategiesof uro-bond Underwriters
To operate in this new market, Euro-bond underwriters developed
a variety of strategies and techniques to expand the marketwhile
controlling risks. The standard syndicate structure in the Euro-bond
market is described by the three-tier framework illustrated in Figure 2.
Members of the underwriting syndicate agree to buy the issue from the
issurer. In the U.S. domestic market, all underwriters are signatories
to the underwriting agreement, and, therefore, have a "direct (several)
obligation to the issuer."27 In the Euro-bond market, 'underwriters"
(as the term appears in Figure 2) bear no obligation to the issuer.28
There is also a selling group with no underwriting responsibility.
Once an allocation of securities is made, all parties are free to
sell the issue as they see fit.29 The lead management group attempts
to instil discipline through economic incentives and disincentives, such-23-
Figure 2
THREE-TIER FRAMEWORK FOR EUROBOND SYNDICATION




as refusing to invite a seller into future syndicates. Large syn-
dicates areusedin efforts to maximize market demand and insure a
successful issue. In the late 1970's, underwriting groups became as
large as 175 firms, with an additional 150 members in the selling
group.3° Naturally in groups this large, some members would not be
able to place their full allocation, resulting in price-stabilization
and discipline problems for the lead managers. Because Euro-bonds
are chiefly in bearer form, members of the selling group could un-
load unwanted bonds in a discreet way with little probability of
being traced.31
Thegrey market or pre-market involves a set of activities that
formalize trading in Euro-bonds prior to the official offering date.
Professional dealers display their transaction prices over the Reuters
Nonitorand a market price is established)2 Other sources publish
grey market prices more widely)3 The grey market reduces risks for
members of the selling group by allowing them to participate in an
organized market if conditions (demand for bonds, interest rate or
-exchange rate developments, etc.) do not evolve as expected. The
grey market also alleviates risks for lead managers because it pro-
vides additional information on the market's response to the issue
(i.e., the extent of dumping) and whether the terms of the issue
ought to be altered. The grey market Oan, in addition, provide in-
formation on the extent of "overpricing" to investors who pay full price
on the day of issue. This concern arises because, as we noted in
Section II, there is reason to believe that spreads (in particular
-the selling concession) are relatively high on the Euro-bond market.
A large selling concession may have been appropriate in terms of sales
to individuals or as a sweetener to, attract sellers in a newly-25-
developingmarket. But large institutional buyers in the Euro-bond
market have had the power to force distributinggroups to share all
or part of the selling concession.4 The marketcan thus exhibit a
two-tierpricing system on any given issue.35
Managers and underwriters in the Euro-bond market have adopted
a number of straightforward procedures to increase the demand for
bonds and to be compensated for additional risks. The Euro-bond
market began as a market for high-quality borrowers, and themarket
continues to be dominated by recognized names. Higher qualitycorn-
pensates for limited information disclosure .-MostEuro-bonds are listed
on stock-exchanges, primarily as a marketing device to make the securities
eligible for some institutional portfolios and promote investor confidence.
Both Moody and Standard & Poor provide Euro-bond ratings services.Spreads
increase with the maturity of Euro-bonds (see Table 6) tocompensate
for the greater risks involved.37 We have also observed theaverage
maturity of Euro-bonds has declined (see Figure 3)asinterest-rate
risk has increased.
Euro-bond underwriters have inveited or adapted other innovative
syndication approaches and issuing techniques. Prior to 1979, the standard
Euro-bond invitation telex included the expected coupon rate based on
current market conditions. In contrast, U.S. domestic issues were priced on
a yield basis after intensive discussions between the lead manager and
other syndicate members. Consequently, a U.S. syndicate could better fix a
yield consistent with secondary market conditions and investor demand.
Coupon, issue price and total commissions were set after the selling period
without being indicated in the invitation telex. The Euro-bond market
adapted this U.S. market practice, known as yield pricing, enabling the
lead manager to work with a smaller syndicate, improve pricing control,
better estimate demand and reduce the need for discipline.-26-
The bought deal or pre-underwritten issue was introduced in
early 1979. The underwriter telexes that funds are available on
specific terms for a short period. If the deal is accepted and
successful, the issue should close quickly, the lead manager alone
placing most or all of the issue. Under volatile market conditions,
the speed of a bought deal is valuable to issuers, but the manager is
exposed to greater underwriting risks.39
Other examples of issuing techniques are the auction issue,
conversion issue, multiple-tranche issue, deferred purchase issue,
convertible issue, •issues indexed to commodities or currencies, and
issues with warrants attached.40 To some extent, these techniques
may be viewed as fads or sweeteners to address uncertainties that
momentarily concern the market. However, some issuing innovations,
like floating rate notes, have captured substantial market shares
and seem to be a permanent and growing feature of the market.
Finally, we should mention the role of Euro-clear and Cedel,
the two computerized depositary, clearing and information networks
for the Euro-bond market. Both systems were founded by private
parties--Euro-clear in 1968 by Morgan Guaranty Trust Company and
Cedel in 1971 by a group of shareholder institutions. In 1972, Mor-
gan Guaranty sold of 97% of its interest in Euro-clear to a group
of 120 user shareholders,2 but continues to manage the system.
In 1980, a bridge linking the two systems came into operation.(a)
-27-
EUROBOND MATURITIES: YEARLY WEIGHTED AVERAGE, 1963-80
4 Yearstonsatutlty
L1.1.111.
Source. Inter-bond Services Ltd.
(b) AVERAGE EURO-DOLLAj BOND MATURITIES, 1963-8O;-
• Esciuding convcrtjh!e bonds.
Source. Inter-bond Services Ltd.-28-
Fisher (1981, P. 182) argues that competition has forced the two
systems to become increasingly similar, but Euro-clear maintains a
two-thirds market share (see Table 5). Both systems, in conjunction
with the Reuters Monitor, have improved the technological efficiency
of trading in the Euro-bond market and promoted new-issue volume.
Assessing Competitive Conditions in the .iuro-bond Iviarket
Inan important sense, a free market that grows from non-existence
to $50 billion annual new issues in twenty years is a success, by
definition. Clearly, the Euro-bond market brings together a large
number of willing borrowers and lenders with substantial benefits
to both groups. Beyond gains to the direct participants, the market
fills a gap in international capital markets, speeding the traditional
recycliflg of funds in the l970s and allowing time for adjustment be-
tween deficit and surplus economies.4 Our objective nowisto
characterizethe orderliness of that free—market setting.
First,in the entire history of the Euromarkets, no bank has
failed solely or even mainly because of Euromarket lending. The
worst shock to hit the market was the failure in June l974' of Bank-
haus Herstatt, a relatively small German institution. The collapse
of Herstatt was the result of imprudent foreign exchange activities.
In terms of bond defaults, Mendelsohn (1980, p. 50) reports that in
the period 1963-1977, $72 billion was raised through 2700 Eurobond
issues. Losses to investors were 0.214% ($170 million) because of
default by 10 small U.S. companies.46
The composition of leading Euro-bond issuers has changed con-
siderably during the history of the market. The top 20 underwriting-29-
Table 6 -ComparativeGrossSpreads in International Bond Markets
UnderwritingManagementSelling Total Commission fee Concession
J.S. domesticmarket
- estimate1 (a) 0.875 -1.0% 0.175 0.200 0.500
- estimate2 (b) 0.75 -1.0 NA NA NA
- estimate3(c) 0.60 -1.5 NA NA NA





- Stocks 4.0% NA NA NA
- Bonds
Public 1.625 -2.0 0.375 -0.5 0- 0.251.125 -1.25
Industrial 2.5 1.00 0.25 1.25
International 1.75 -2.0 0.50 -0.75 0.25 1.00
France (f)
- Bonds
First category 1.75% 0.50 0.10 1.15
Second category 3.00 0.75 0.25 2.00
Switzerland (g)
- Bonds
Government 1.50% NA NA NA
Foreign 3.00 NA NA NA
urobond rna.rket(h)
Under 5years 2.00% 0.375 0.375 1.25
5-8 years 2.25 0.375 0.375 1.25
more than 8 years 2.50 0.500 0.500 1.50
1otes: a) Mendelsohn (1980, p. 183) and Mendelsohn (1983, P. 18)
b) Van Agtmael (1983, p.5)
c)Fisher (1981, p. 81)
d) Maycock (1983, p. 5)
e)Dufey andKrishnan(1983, p. 22)
f) Aftalion and Bompaire (1983, p. 7)
g) Corti (1983, p. 40 and p. 45)
h) I'iendelsohn (1980, p. 184)Table
Eurobond Market
Note: Euro-bonds include Floating Rate Notes and bond issues in all
currencies. Percentages are calculated by allocating the
full amount of the issue to sole lead managers and equal
amounts to joint lead managers.
Source: Prepared by Clifford Austin Billinghurst for
Morgan Guaranty Ltd., London.
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7 -Top20 Underwriting Firms in The
asof1982 and Their anks in Earlier Years
Firm
122 222
Credit Suisse First Boston 36.25 111.48 19.57 113.48 115.09
Deutsche Bank 1 23.31 28.71 28.56 45.91 210.44
Morgan Stanley 221.13 34.7936.72 26.49 37.87
Morgan Guaranty -- - 360.75122.26 44.19
Salomon Brothers NA0.30 241.26131.81 64.43 53.76
Merrill Lynch 171.4130 0.88300.96 54.68 63.64
Swiss Bank Corp. 290.82330.85221.46 162.06 73.63
S. G. Warburg 53.58 53.7744.32 36.02 83.3?
Goldman Sachs NA0.1013 2.2053.51132.25 92.50
Societe Generale 161.54 6 3.6083.18102.50102.12
Union Bank of Switzerland 92.3110 2.78191.65 152.0711 1.98
Dresdner Bank 45.55 7 3.40 73.26-- 121.60
Commerzbank 72.63 21 1.41201.62 — — 13 1.53
Nomura 121.92 161.93241.19 72.85141.53
Amsterdarn-Rotterdam i62.76 261.07161.74300.81151.49
Orion Royal Bank i41.63 12 2.28112.22 82.72161.42
Credit Lyonnais 191.22 152.15291.03340.72171.41
Citicorp 270.94 11 2.30121.97 231.22181.37
Manufacturers Hanover
—- 14 2.15-- 251.01191.30
West deutsche Landesbank 29.83 44.78102.23181.35201.23-31-
firmsas of 1982 and their rankings since 1978 aregivenin Table 7.
Amongthe top 10 firms in 1982, we find five American firms. Of
the top 10 firms in 1978, only three(Credi-t Suisse First Boston,
Deutsche Bank, andWarburg)remained in the top-JO of 1982. Part
of the shuffling of ranksisthe result of exogenous events--DM
weakness on the foreign exchange market prompted the German authori-
ties to be cautious about allowing new 1DM issues (almost always
led by German banks), continued dollar strength has increased de-
mand for Eurodollar bonds (often managed by U.S. houses) and U.S.
borrowers have returned in large numbers to the market (generally
choosing U.S.underwriters ).In1978 the situation was reversed,
and German and Swiss banks dominated the list with only two U.S.
houses in the top 20. Mendelsohn (1980, p. 19LI) notes that, going
back 10 years further, U.S. houses again dominated the list as
American companies, driven away by OFDI requirements were heavy
borrowers. Only in the l970s did "placing power" assume importance
and cause the Swiss, German, and other European banks to enter into
the top ranks of underwriters.
Concentration ratios for Euro-bond underwriters are reported
in Table 8. Percentage shares are calculated by awarding full
credit to a sole lead manager and equal proportional credit to joint
lead managers. The data suggest a slight decline in concentration
among the top 10 houses, but this may reflect the decline in the
role of the DIi after 1978. Comparable ratios for U.S. investment
bankingare shownin Table 9,whichgives full credit tothefirm
thatruns the books. The market share of the largest firm is ap-
proximately the samein both the U.S. and Euro-bond markets. However,-32-
Table 8 Concentration Ratios
in Eurobond Underwriting 1978-1982
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Top 1 23% 11% 10% 13%
30 29 32 38
TopS 49 34 33 37 41
Top8 56 43 147 52
Top 10 61 47 52 57
Top15 70 60 57 63 65
Top25 82 76 72 76 77
Source: Prep'ed by Clifford Austin Billinghurst for Morgan
Guaranty Ltd., London.
Note: Eurobonds include Floating date Notes and bond issues in all
currencies. Percentages arecalculatedby allocating the
full amount of the issue to sole lead managers and equal
amounts to joint lead mangers.—33-
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* InvestmentDealers' Digest annLzai Directories of
corporate finance for 1975 to 1982. Percentage
of total dollar volume of underwri-tings using
figures giving full credit to the manager handling
the books.
Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust Company-34-
the concentration ratios for the largest 5 through 25 firms is con-
siderably smaller in the Euro-bond market. The inference is that
competitive forces are greater among Euro-bond underwriters.
Note that affiliates of U.S. commercial banks listed in Table 7
include Morgan Guaranty, Citicorp, and Manufacturers Hanover.
In their study of U.S. investment banking, Hayes, Spence and
Marks (1983, p. 55) argue that the stability of client relation—
ships over time is a significant indicator of competition. Switching
of relationships suggests the presence of competitive forces, while
inertia in relationships may create a persistent state of market
disequilibrium. The authors conclude that while relationships give
the appearance of fluidity, the major apex firms have maintained
a firm hold on the large and important clients in the U.S. domestic
market. However, we may expect to observe some differences between "bought
deals" and Regulation 415 issues, which appear to be making the U.S. market
more competive.
Evidence from the Eurornarket suggests a considerable degree of
switching among management syndicates. Mendelsohn (1983, p.12) notes
that while a few major firms may dominate the rankings, "one does not
find the same group of managers united in an offering with monotonous
regularity." An analysis by Euromoney of two top—ranking underwriters, Cr&lit
Suisse and Deutsche Bank, drew similar conclusions.4'
Finally we compiled data on the number of lead managers used by
issuers with three or more Eurodollar bond issues outstanding (see
Table 10). For the sample of 107 issuers, 75% had used the services
of two or more lead managers. For the entire group, the average—35/36—
Table 10 Number of Lead Managers for Agencies with Three or
More Euro-dollar Bond issues.






1 2 3 4 5 6-10 more than 10Total
Source: Weekly Eurobond Guide
Notes: (a) Reflects issues outstanding on October 28, 1983. Agencies
include corporations, governmental bodies, and supranational
agencies. Bond issues include straight bonds, zero coupon
bonds and floating rate notes.
(b) Includes 5 banks who lead managed all of their own issues.
For all companies with three or more issues, percentage with two or
more managers is 77/lO775%.
312 8 7 NA NA NA NA 27
4 9 3 7 2 NA NA NA 21
55 7 1 1 0 NA NA 14
103 8 4 6 2 7 NA 30
1 0 1 1 2 0 6








0 1 0 2 0 1 2 6
19 12 4 11
October 28, 1983
2 107-37-
number of issues is about sixandthe average number of managers
nearly three. This reflects both aggressive bidding for new business
by underwriters and the willingness of issuers to switch lead mana-
ger affiliations.
IV.Problemsand Risks in the Euro-bondMarket
Theevidence in Sections II and III portrays the Euro—bond market as
a dynamic and highly competitive market. Our objective now is to describe
some of the most serious criticisms that have been made concerning
Euro-bond market operations.Since the
Euro-bondmarket operates subject to a minimum ofregulations, itis
reasonable to ask whether the U.S. domestic securities market might
develop similar "problems" ifbarriers restricting competition in
securities underwriting were removed. It is important to keep in
mind that the Euromarket began de novo only about 20 years ago, making
it essential to distinguish temporary from permanent problems. We
shall also stress that what may be perceived as "problems" for in-
dividual firms--forexample, being forced out of the market--may
simplyreflect the natural operation of competitive forces that are
desirable from a broader perspective.
Degree of Competition
Problems of excessive competition in the Euro-bond market have
been cited for the last ten years. The alleged problem manifests
itself in two ways:(1) Too many houses competing for a position on
tombstones; and (2) Mispricing caused by houses bidding too aggres-
sively for new issues. Obviously, these are relative statements.-38-
Problem(1) implies that there may be too many houses competing rela-
tive to the number that would allow existing houses to make "fair"
underwriting profits. The sense of (2) is that new issues, priced
ex ante with incomplete information, may appear mispriced relative
to the price necessary to clear the marketexpost, after the actual
market demand has been revealed.
Regarding the first point, Mendelsohn (1980, p. 185) argues
that "most banks are in the new issue market for prestige rather
than money." With simple arithmetic, it is easily shown that under-
writing returns are heavily skewed toward the managers, and the
148 remainder of the selling group receives very little. ewirtz
(1983b) maintains that rankings on the league table of active issuers
may be important, but many houses see their presence in the Euro-bond
market as defensive. A house that cannot service a borrower off-
shore may lose his business onshore as well. Many houses are still
small but expect to grow, covering current underwriting losses with
secondarymarket trading profits.
Thefirst problem of manyhouses competing for business con-
tributesto the second problem. If an oversupply of houses is vying
for syndicate participations, lead managers will be encouraged to bid
more aggressively for new issues. Gewirtz (1983b) concludes that
"as long as underwriting syndicates are used to swallow mispriced
deals, the problem will never go away". However, as long as competition
does not destabliize the system, it is really inmiaterial that
someinstitutions lose money on some deals.
The excess competition problem is a serious one because it
leads to other difficulties. Houses that accept allocations for-39-
prestigemay have to dump their securities in the grey market.
Houses without placing power may be easy targets for professional
buyers seeking discounts. This leads to two-tier pricing and problems
of syndicate discipline, although not necessarily problems from the
point of view of institutional safety and soundness.
While shortages or surpluses sometimes arise in a particular
market, when competition exists these conditions arebothtemporary and
self-correcting.In 1977, Euromoney commented that while "Under-
writers aregivenseveral opportunities to drop out of an issue...
in the Euromarkets underwriters seldom drop out...not only because they would
lose their underwriting fee, but they would lose face with the manager if they
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did so." Less than four years later in an article focusing on the return of
realistic pricing, Euromoney reported that as a consequence of past losses,
"banks increased the number of underwritings they refused. The re-
fusal rate, it is thought, was running at 30% at the end of last
year. This has almost certainly increased to over50%." Con-
tinuing the trend, Engel (1983) notd "sharply reduced willing-
ness of banks to support mispricedissues."52 He argued that the
development of a highly liquid grey market has permitted managers
to observe prices first-hand. "The mechanism (of the grey
market) is so effective and so anonymous that some lead managers
have ended up buying virtually the whole of an issue whose price
they chose todefend."53
Thus, for the moment, the problem of excess competition appears
to have eased. Syndicate members have some scope for refusing mis-
priced deals, and lead managers have increased incentives for ac-
curate pricing._i40_
Secondary 1arket Liauidi-ty
Closely related to primary market problems is the efficiency of
secondary market transactions. Mendelsohn (1980, p.195)indicates
thatthe secondary market for Euro-bonds used to be described
"accurately, if unkindly, as consistingofa broker telephoning
himself."This is stillthe case for some among the 3,600 Euro-
bond issues currently outstanding. Liquidity was not an essential
factor in the early days of the market, when bonds were held to
maturityprimarily by individual investors. Now thatinstitutional
buyersdominatethe market, liquidity is an important factor.
Engel (1983, p. 24) argues that it will cost borrowers more if the
manager does not have a long-term commitment to the issue in the
secondary market. Lead managers generally respond that their primary
responsibility is to the issuers and not other professional market
makers.They participate in market making, but capital allocated
tothis activity must be balanced against other considerations.55
By some measures--volume o±newissues (Table 1)andsecondary market
trading(Table 5)--liquidityhas grown substantially. However, for-
mal tests of transaction costs and efficiency of the Euro-bond market
have not been reported.
"Excessive" spreads
While transaction costs in the secondary market are not known,
the breakdown of primary market gross spreads is widely publicized
(see Table 6). As noted, spreads intheEuro-bond market ap-
pearhigh relative to the U.S. domestic market, but moderate relative
to foreign markets.The origin of these costs lies in the crucial_141 -
roleplayed by the Continental banks in placing a new issue.
Initially, it was essential to have the cooperation of Continental
banks in order to guarantee the success of a new issue. To get the
full cooperation of distributors, it was necessary to provide com-
pensation at least equal to what they earned on domestic issues.
Since sales to individuals predominated, the large selling concessions
may have been justified. After large institutional buyers entered
the market, the generous spread "became an anachronism," and two-
tiered pricing resulted.6
It is difficult to judge where matters stand at the present
time. Mendelsohn (1983, p. 16) argues that Continental banks are
still the marginal sellers of an issue and, therefore, set the price
for services, even though their role in the market is smaller than
it was initially. On the other hand, Engel (1983, p. 214) claims
that "large—scale placing at about the same price level throughout
the market" is characteristic of current practice. The issue of
uniform primary market pricing is important since it affects our
assessment of conflicts of interest, as discussed below.
The notion of 'excessive" spreads might also be interpreted to
mean excessive relative to the underwritng risks incurred. We have already
noted the asymmetric structure of fees earned by syndicate members. Those
in the selling group earn very little, but this seems comensurate with the
risks involved. A member of the selling group holds no underwriting risk;
he need request bonds only if he has a buyer. He might request more bonds
than he knows he can sell (a) if he wants to appear like a larger force in
the market and improve his image, or (b) if the manager is likely to allot
him only a fraction of his request. In either case, he will have unsold
bonds that can be dumped anonymously in the grey market. Managers, on the
other hand, bear true underwriting risk, but Mendelsohn (1983, p.15) argues
that the risk is "significantly small", since "issues are largely circled
before the underwriting- -
agreementsare signed, and.. .inmost instances the circling com-
mitment is honored." This observation seems consistent withthe less
disciplined syndicate organization and the reluctance ofmanagers
to pursue syndicate members for excess underwriting costs. Ifpro-
fits were more scarce and less certain, organizationalarrangements
would change.
Managers feel (relatively) secure with their risks because new issues
are largely circled. Issuers feel secure because they can compete among
lead managers for the best terms and the best services. The members of the
selling group generally feel secure with their positions because alloca-
tions can be sold forward in the grey market. This leaves only the buyers
to protect their interests, and these as noted, are dominatedby large p/€yers.
Conflicts of Interest
Conflicts of interest in the Euro-bond market do not seem to
57 pose serious problems even in the absence of external regulation.
The primary conflict o± interest cited in the literature is for Con-
tinental banks, which simultaneously underwrite new issues andcarry
respcnsibility for individual investment funds. It is claimed that
the placing power of many Continental banks comes precisely from
58 their ability to sell new issues to relativelypassive clients.
In addition to the Question whether the Continental bankcan perform
unbiased investment analysis for their investment accounts, is the
issue of two-tier pricing. Continental banks with a vested interest
in underwriting the new issue are presumed to buy atpar (retail)
rather than passing along any institutional discounts, or discounts
that might be apparent from grey market prices prior to the formal
issue date. The investment managers under such conditions hardly- -
performa "best—efforts" service on behalf of their clients.
Sales of this nature, from bank underiting department to in-
vestment clients, are not allowed under U.S. regulations. And dis-
closure of transactions and grey market prices would allow individuals
to monitor the performance of their portfolios.
Still, if owners of individual investment accounts are being
"stuffed', why don't they move their accounts elsewhere? The answer
is that individual trusts receive the tremendous tax advantage of
bearer bonds and no taxes withheld on interest, which more than off-
sets the extra 1% or 2% they may have paid on issue, and the fact that
a few bonds of questionable quality may have crept into the port-
folio. It is a reasonable bargain for all the participants to have
struck. The real problem is the limited extent of price competition
in the supply of "secrecy services"--it appears that individual ac-
count holders must sacrifice some performance to obtain secrecy.
The Grey IVarket
The grey market, or pre-market, was originally perceived as a
threat to an orderly primary Euro-bond market with uniform pricing.
The grey market made it easier for members of the selling group to
break ranks with the syndicate and dump their allocations early--
actually, to sell them today for future delivery.
In the short run, it is not clear whether the grey market
helped to fragment pricing further, or simply brought under public
scrutiny the extent of weakness in any new issue. Over the longer
run, itisclear that the second effect has dominated. The grey
marketis credited with helping to increase the liquidity of the- 144
primary market. It also offers new information to syndicatemanagers
by indicating the market's response to a new issue. If leadmanagers
were to distribute underwriting losses across the syndicate, the
grey market price would provide a useful reference point. By in-
creasing liquidity and providing information, the grey market de-
creases the chance for issue mispricing and increases the chance
for a successful offering. The grey market could also supply a
reference point for individual investors to evaluate the performance of in-
vestment managers. As such, it potentially reduces the practice
of "stuffing" individual investmentaccounts, as noted above.
Effectiveness of the Self-Regulatory Organization
Althoughthe Euro-bond market operates with minimal government
regulation, participants in the market have foundit intheir interest
toestablish a self-regulatory body. The Association of International
Bond Dealers (AIBD) fills this role. AIBD was founded in 1969
under Swiss law and is based in Z\Irich. 60 riiembership is nearly
600, and includes all the major financial institutions active in
either primary or secondary markets. The Board of AIBD has created
severalsubcommittees to study general areas of concern such as
education, settlements, market practices and so forth. The Associa-
tion holds an annual meeting each April toconsider specific proposals.
Mendelsohn(1983, p. l) asserts that AIED's major role has
been in secondary market trading, and that the Association's authority
is not accepted concerning primary market practices. Even though
most Euro-bonds are exchange-listed, most secondary market trading
takes place over-the-counter through market-makers recognized by61
AIBD. In the primary market, there is no way to recognize a bona
fide member of the brokerage community entitled to selling reallowance
(i.e., wholesale price reduction). Consequently, price cutting in
the primary market depends on individual market power.
Complaints by underwriters concerning primary market practices
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have been a regular theme of trade publications. Smaller firms
complain of being stuck with mispriced issues, and being left out
when quality paper comes to the market. The larger firms point out
their discipline problems, and the difficulties of stabilizing a
price when small underwriters dump in the grey market. Although
the Association's Primary Market Committee has discussed the mis-
pricing of new issues and related problems, the debate has never
been in public at an annual meeting. As noted earlier, the refusal
rate among underwriters has risen, and the spread of new issue prices
has converged so that, to some extent, these primary market problems
have been self-correcting.
For its part, AIBD prefers to deal with technical issues—-
Euro-bond settlements, a specialized calculator for Euro-bond dealers,
a standardized form for all bonds--and it appears to be fairly suc-
cessful in these pursuits.6 It has left insoluble problems (such
as trying to enforce a code or realistic new issue pricing) to be
worked out by the market. AIBD does not possess any statutory powers,
and so it must operate on consensus. The membership recognizes the
need for self-regulation (to promote investor confidence and demand),
but also realizes that freedom from regulatory constraints has con-
tributed enormously to the growth and success of the market. Given
this history, it seems that AIBD will seek market solutions to problemsrather than attempting to impose rules of behavior.
Distinguish Micro Problems from Macro Problems
In 1982, 780 new Euro-bond issues were launched, raisingover
$50 billion. Secondary market trading volume surpassed $800 billion.
Given these orders of magnitude and the volatility of exchange rates
and interest rates, it seems unlikely that all transactions could
have been executed without problems, or that there were no frictions
between competing parties. However, it is important to differentiate
between problems that affect a single issue, an individual firm, or
a particular time period, and problems that are life-threatening to
the Euro-bond market as a whole and to its constituent institutions.
Trade publications delight in describing broken deals, perhaps
more so than smashing successes.6 The chance of launching an issue
when interest rates or exchange rates change suddenly, or tryingan
innovative issuing approach (e.g., the zero-coupon Euro-bond) that
suddenly loses market favor is an integral part of the underwriting
risk.6Naturally, mistakes of this sort (and underwriting losses)
occur, but the market appears to learn quickly and to respond ration-
ally. Activity dries up and maturities shorten in response to in-
terest rate volatility. Firms seek other innovations (e.g., Floating
Rate Notes), or return to traditional straight debt depending on de-
mand conditions in the market.
To a great extent, then, micro problems (i.e. problems of in-
dividual issues, firms, or time periods) appear to have been self-.
correcting in the Euro-bond market without threatening its overallintegrity. Operating in the absence of statutory regulation is not
a license for stupidity--it is almost the contrary. Underwriters
who make mistakes must either learn from experience or leave the
market. Problems of excess competition and mispricing appear to
have been attenuated by members of selling groups learning to refuse
baddeals, and by a grey market that sends an early warning to lead
managers.
Large borrowers appear to be well-treated in the Euro-bond
market. They have shown a propensity to switch lead managers and
toshop for the best deal. Large investors and institutions also
have the skill to spot mispriced deals, and the power to extract
fair pricing. Only the "small" investor, whose funds are managed by
some Continental banks appears to be at a perpetual disadvantage.
This problem could be reduced if investment managers were required
to perform best-effort transactions (as in the U.S., at arm's length
from the underwriting department) on behalf of their clients. Con-
sidering the tax advantages captured by these "small" investors, their
"revealed preference" to incur these costs for the benefit of secrecy
may in fact suit their individual needs.
V. Scope for Increasing Competition in U.S. Investment Banking
The first foursectionsof this paper analyzed the operations
of the Euro-bond market. Competition among managers and underwriters
is virtually unrestrained in the U.S. dollar and Canadian dollar seg-
ment of this market. Proposals to increase competition in U.S. in-
vestment banking would repeal the Glass Steagall Act and permit-48-
separately capitalized securities affiliates of U.S. commercial
banks to perform the full range of investment banking services for
corporations and rnunicipaiities.6 This is currently the case in
most of the world's major developed countries.
Our purpose in this section is first to review the experience
with combined commercial and investment banking in the rest of the
world, and to draw lessons concerning conflicts of interest,opera-
tional efficiency, and related issues. We then combine these
findings with our analysis of the uro-bond market to assess the
chances for a favorable transplant of competitive Euro-bond under-
writing practices into the U.S. domestic market.
Permissible Bank Activities Worldwide
An overview of permissible banking activities across countries
is presented in Table 11. Among these countries, only Canada and
Japan have regulations similar to the United States that prohibit
the combination of commercial banking and investment banking acti-
vities. Dale (1982, p. 42) notes that in Japan the U.S.-stylesepara-
tion of commercial and investment banking "is regardedas an his-
torical accident rather than a prudential necessity". Table 11sug-
gests that banks outside the United States have the right to engage
in a wider range of activities, including life insurance,equity
participations in non-banking firms and security market transactions.
An extreme example is in Germany, where the banking act grantsa
monopoly for all securities brokerage business to banks.68
The relationship between the nature of the banking system and





1. UNITED STATES Commercial Banks not allowed to underwrite corporate
securities or municipal revenue bonds. They may
underwrite general obligation bonds and arrange
private placements. Restrictions on interstate
banking and non-bank activities.
2. BELGIUM Banks may hold equity shares in connection with
their underwriting activity.
3. CANADA Insurance, fiduciary and underwriting activities
not allowed.
Banks cannot own more than 10% of shares in a
non—bank company.
4. FRANCE Underwriting allowed.
Deposit banks may hold up to 20% of shares in a
non-bank company.
Investment banks may hold up to 100% of shares in
a non-bank company, only financed by deposits
greater than or equal to two years maturity.
5.GERIViANY Universal banking, banks engage in all financial
activities.
Banks hold a legal monopoly on all securities
brokerage activities.
6. HONG KONG Underwriting allowed.




Banks cannot hold more than 2% of their capital
in non-bank company shares.
8. JAPAN American pattern.
Underwriting prohibited except for public sector
bonds and by bank overseas subsidiaries.
9.LUXEIVIBOURG No statutory restrictions
10. NETHERLANDS Underwriting allowed.
No direct restrictions on bank activities.
Equity participations greater than 5%aresubject
to approval.
11. SINGAPORE No separation of commercial and investment banking.
Banks cannot hold more than 25% of their capital
in non-bank company shares.
12. SWITZERLAND Universal banking.
No formal restrictions on banks.
13. UNITED KINGDOM No specific controls.
All activities allowed subject to capital adequacy
constraints.
By tradition, a separation between deposit taking
banks (i.e. accepting houses) and merchant banks
(i.e. issuing houses).
** *
SourcesRichard Dale, "Bank Supervision Around the World",




MARKET SHARES OF MAJOR BANKS




Germany big three banks(1)... ...51 13 11
France big three banks ...... 61 25 18
Italy big five banks...... 4.3 23 19
Ntherlands big three banks' '...... 80 35 15
Switzerland big three banks 77 32 17
Sweden big four banks ...87 51 224
Japan 12 city banks .... 61 30 21
USA 176 money-centre bank... 2 15
UK London clearing banks 1) 6ti (3i 20
(1) Based on group figures.
The banks included areasfollows:
Germany: Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank
France: Banque Nationale de Paris, Credit Lyonnais, Societe Generale
Italy: Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, BancaComrnercialeItaliana,
Credito Italiano, Banco di Roma, Banco di Napoli;
Netherlands: Algemene Bank Nederland, Arnsterdam-Rotterdam Bank,
Nederlandsche Midderistandsbank;
Switzerland: Swiss Bank Corporation, Union Bank of Switzerland,
Swiss Credit Bank;
Sweden: PK Banken, Svenska Handeisbanken, Skandinaviska. Enskilda Banken,
Gotabanken
Source: "Wilson Report", (1980. p. 351).-52-
emulatesthe U.S. style of separation between commercial and invest—
rnentbanking,yet official guidance is used heavily to effect in-
terest rates and credit aiiocation.6 European banks, on the other
hand, allow banks to compete with each other and to offer the widest
possible variety of financial services. Yet, as Table 12 illustrates1
the concentration of commercial banking activities is much higher
in Europe thaninthe United States.7°
Factors in the US. favoring a Successful AdaDtation of Competitive
uro-bond Practices
We now turn to consider those factors in the U.S.economy that
would either complement the positive features of the Euro-bond
market or offset the negative features described earlier. For the
sake of this exercise, we assume that concentration (and returns) in
the U.S. investment banking industry are currently high relative toa
fullycompetitiveindustry (see accompanying paper by Pugel and
White). Regulation has prohibited one naturalgroup of competitors
(commercial banks) from entering the market. High economic•costs
have restricted new competition from the United States and abroad
from entering the market and reducing concentration.
The Euro-bond market is close to a textbook example ofa purely
competitive market.71 As such, it is not difficult to enumerate
the key features that contributed to the growth andstability
of that market:72
1) Financial expertise: Skifled people to establish realistic
offering prices, adjust for changing market conditions.
innovate new products, andcontainrisks.
2) Techniques for risk management: Fcrmation of large
syndicates,well-known issuers, forward sales in the
grey market, yield pricing.-53-
3) J'iarketingexpertise: Knowledge of borrower and investor
preferences concerning issue costs, information disclosure,
tax benefits, and so forth; access to an effective
distribution system.
)Communicationstechnology: Reuters monitor; Euroclear
and Cedel for clearing transactions.
5)Liquidsecondary markets: To promote primary market demand.
6) Financial capital: To absorb temporary losses.
We assert without formal proof that these features of the
Euro-bond market are also characteristic of U.S. financial markets
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activitieswere left open to free competition, the level of financial
expertise, risk management skills, and communications technology
is such to encourage a stable supply of investment banking services
at competitive rates.
Our review also noted several negative factors about the
Euro-bond market and the operation of commercial bank affiliates
in that market. Might similar negative features also become part
of a U.S. banking system if free competition in corporate financial
services were permitted?
1) Conflict of Interest. One potential conflict involves
Continental banks and their roles as part of the underwriting group
and as managers ofinvestment funds. The suggestion in the
literature is that excess underwriting fees or unrealistic prices
have been passed along to unsuspecting, usually passive, trust ac-
counts. In contrast, "self-dealing" is now prohibited under U.S.
regulations and applies to subsidiaries as well as affiliates.''3
Another conflict arises between banks and corporate borrowers.European practice of combined commercial and investmentbanking
has been associated with relatively close andexclusive ties be-
tween banks and non-financial corporations. Onefear is that the
banks might refuse to provide certain commercialbanking services
(e.g., loans, lines of credit, foreign exchange) toa corporation
unless the bank also provides investmentbanking services. In the
United States, such "tie-in" sales are in restraintof competition
and prohibited by the Sherman Act.4 A related fearis that closer
bank/corporate ties might reduce the bank's ability toprepare un-
biased loan appraisals or increase the chances forunsound lending.
This abuse is a theoretical possibility buthighly remote given
that imprudent lendng could be detectedby bank examiners and
subject the bank and its management to regulatory sanctionsand
civil liability.75
2) Concentration in Banking. The datasuggest that banking
concentration is substantially higher abroad than in theUnited
States. However Japan, which does havea U.S.-s-tyle separation of
commercial and investment banking, also showshigher concentration.
The United States currently has more than 14,000commercial banks.
Even if interstate banking is permitted anda wave of mergers
fol1ow, the Sherman Act could be used topreclude anti-competitive
mergers in either commercial or investment banking activities.
3) Macroeconomic Regulation. We have pointed outthat macro-
economic regulation in countries with combined commercialand in-
vestment banking often takes shape through controlson the amount-55-
and distribution of credit. These measures would be contrary -to
a free market for credit. We have argued that these macroeconomic
policies are more characteristic of small open economies with
a tradition of strong central direction. It is highly remote
that the United States would tend toward more centralized control
over credit, even if it were easier to implement under a more in-
tegrated banking system.
Factors Favoring a less Successful Adaptation and/or Small Gains
from Competitive Euro-bond Practices
Markets may establish efficient pricing through competition
from either the supply or the demand side. Traditionally, one
thinks of competition among suppliers to provide services at the
lowest possible prices to capture market share. The result is
that all buyers, even those who are completely uninformed about
the market, pay the same, fair price for services. On the other
hand, one can imagine competition from the demand side to pressure
a group of oligopolistic suppliers. Well-informed buyers, who
know the fair price for services, may withhold demand, seek close
substitutes (bank loans, commercial paper, auction issues) and
otherwise pressure suppliers to offer services at a fair price.
Eventually, virtually any cartel will break and fair prices will
re suit.
In -the U.S. investment banking industry, the statistics
on concentration do not reveal much variation. If anything,
concentration has tended to increase in the l97Os. However,
Hayes, Spence and Marks(l98,p. 79) conclude that the concentra-
tion data is deceptive because the market is actually composed-56-
of distinct segments within which substantial competition takes
place but between which competition may be less robust."
On the demand side, market observers describe a kind of
"in-house" competition that has developed in the last 20 years.6
Historically, corporate financial officers relied heavily on their
investment bankers for expertise. Over the years, the quality
of financial staff resources of major U.S. corporations hasgrown
substantially. Consequently, firms are more capable of distinguish-
ing the value of alternative investment banking services, and to
judge which are cost-effective. In some cases, clients have turned
to alternatives that avoid the use of investment banking services
altogether. SEC Rule ki on shelf registrationought to allow
corporations additional time to shop for the best deal.
Large corporations can also turn to the Euro-bond market for
active competition if they feel that the domestic market conditions
are not sufficiently competitive, as U.S. corporations are in-
creasingly prepared to do.78 The initial attraction is the lower
cost of offshore funding, but corporations often enjoy secondary
benefits in having their underwriting business sought by more
competitors. Unfortunately, the Euro-bond market alternative is
available primarily to larger firms.79
There is reason to believe that the larger, well-informed U.S.
corporations have already inspired a highly competitive atmosphere
in U.S. investment banking. By actively comparing Euro-bond and
U.S. domestic bond issues, U.S. corporations may be "arbitraging"
these differences and forcing the price of U.S. investment banking
services to competitive levels. It is not clear whether small-57 -
corporations,without access to the Euro-bond market, also re-
ceive competitive prices for securities underwriting services.
Accepting this argument, efficiency gains from allowing further
competition in U.S. investment banking would be relatively small.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
At the start of this paper, we observed that the market for
investment banking services in the United States is not freely
competitive because the Glass-Stegall Act excludes one major group
of competitors (securities affiliates of commercial banks) from
the market. As a result, agents that provide both commercial and
investment banking services do not exist in the United States.
The Euro-bond market offers an opportunity to examine the opera-
tion of a market in which there arefewofficial regulations and
no restrictions on who may provide securities underwriting services.
The behavior of foreign banks that combine commercial and invest-
ment banking was analyzed through their operations in the Euro-bond
market and in their onshore activities.
Data on the Euro-bond market were presented to describe the
dimensions and competitive efficiency of the market. By all
standard measures--new issue volume, secondary market volume, de-
fault rate on bonds, underwriting concentration ratios--the Euro-
bond market must be labelled a success. Without official guidance
or subsidy, it has grown a size essentially equal to the U.S. do-
mestic bond market. Adaptation and innovation--syndicate organi-
zation, the grey market, automated clearing, and so forth--have
accompanied growth. To some extent, individual underwriting-8-
successes may ha'e been the result of exogenous events (e.g.,ex-
change rate changes that effected the supply of Dlvibondsalways
lead by German banks) or the beneficial impact that financial
secrecy may have on placing power (in the case of Swiss banks).
Overall, however, competitive conditions have seemed to stabilize
the market--with the availability and terms for fundsresponsive
to market conditions and the more efficient and innovative firms--
including affiliates of U.S. commercial banks--capturing market
share .Firmsin the market have behaved prudently and did not
use the absence of regulation as an opportunity for taking ex-
cessive risks.
In our review of European banking practices a number of
areas for concern were highlighted, including conflict of in-
terest between investment and underv.Titing activities, ex-
cessive linkages between banks and corporations, and concentra-
tion in banking activities. We pointed out that U.S. regulations
pertaining to disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, anti-competitive
practices and the like would prevent similar developments in the
U.S. market. The tendency for official guidance inmany foreign
credit markets, we argued, has little to do with the fact thatwe
find combined commercial and investment banking in these countries.
The paper has documented one case in Which a largelyunregu-
lated financial market produced very favorable results. Existing
regulation seems capable of dealing with known abuses and points
of concern about the linkage of commercial and investment banking
activities. The decision to abolish Glass-Steagall restrictions
could be framed in terms of cost/benefit analysis. The costs are-59-
theincreased risk to the banking system via bank/corporation,
bank/trustee, bank/depositor relations. From the Euro-bond
market experience, the risks appear small and manageable. The
benefits result from incroased competition in the supply of in-
vestment banking services. Given the power of large corporations
and their access to a competitive Euro-market, the benefits of
increased competition may be small for this group. However, al-
lowing increased domestic competition would make these benefits
more certain and expand their availability to all firms.- /90-
FOOTNOTES
1. The distinction between the Euro—bond market and foreign securities
markets is discussed in Section II.
2. Most OECD countries do not formally separate commercial and investment
banking and, as we will describe, some countries permit banks to
engage in essentially any activity (i.e. universal or multi-purpose
banking) including substantial equity positions in non—financial
companies. However, the few exceptions -—theUnited States, Canada,
Japan and perhaps the United Kingdom, where precedent separates commercial
and investment banking ——comprisethe three largest financial markets in
the world. See Richard Dale, Bank Supervision Around the World, (New York:
Group of Thirty), 1982.
3. In some sense, question two probes into the macroeconomic costs and benefits
associated with eliminating the separaration of commercial and investment
banking. Our research design might propose to compare the macroeconomic
performance of industrial countries in which commmercial banking and
investment banking are formally separated with those in which the activities
are combined. Macroeconomic performance varies considerably across countries
and undoubtedly, regulations affecting the financial sector and the
institutional structure of banking play a role. However, macroeconomic
performance is a function of many variables and without a highly detailed
model it is impossible to determine how great that role is.
4. Mendelsohn (1983, p.5) makes the argument that the thrust of regulation
in the United States is disclosure while in Europe, regulation is directed
toward resource allocation, national planning and monetary control.
Consequently, U.S. authorities for the most part impose no restrictions
on issue volume as long as the appropriate disclosure is made. European
authorities frequently establish a queue for new issues which is managed
to prevent market "congestion" or to achieve interest rate or exchange
rate targets. One could argue that these regulatory objectives play the
dominant role in European capital markets rather than the coincidence of
commercial and investment banking. For more on the regulation of security
markets in Europe, see Wymeersch (1983).
5. Throughout this paper we assume that existing U.S. regulations
concerning information disclosure, anti—competitive behavior and
anti—competitive mergers would apply, even if the Glass-Steagall act were
abolished.
6. While it would be interesting to document the innovations in the Euro—bond
market made by U.S. commercial bank affiliates, it is beyond the scope of
this paper to do so. Our purpose is to shed light on the behavior and
characteristics of an unregulated financial market rather that specific
individuals within that market.
7. If existing restrictions on interstate branching were maintained, the
ability of securities affiliates of U.S. commercial banks to place securities
across state lines might be questioned. For our analysis, we assume that such
restrictions would not apply to securities affiliates and that they would be
permitted to compete on equal terms with existing investment banking houses.
8. Croussernent (1981) states that the first Euro-bond issuewas
in 1961 for the Portuguese oilcompany SACOR in the amount of
5,000,000EuropeanUnits of Account.-61-
9. 'WorldFinancial Markets, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company,
New York,November 1983. Total volume in the first 10 months'
ofl983was down 7%from1982. See Carl Gewirtz,"Declines
in Eurobond Activity Tied to Drop in Dollar Issues," International
Herald Tribune, November 29, 1983a, p. 9.
10. See Gewirtz, ibid., and Weekly Eurobond Guide, Datastrearn
International Limited, London, various issues.
11. These aregrossnew issues, without netting out security
redemptions. See Financial Statistics Month1, OECD, November
1983, p. i24.
12. Mendelsohn (1983, p. 10).
13. After January 1, 1983, new federal regulations require U.S.
citizens to hold Eurobonds in registered form. U.S. in-
vestors must elect registered form as an option, even though
the bulk of Eurobond.issues will remain in bearer form. See
Read (1983) for further details.
lLi..Mendelsohn (1983, p. 10) andMagraw(1983, p. 3).
15. Fisher (1981, p. 95), and Mendelsohn (1983, p. 7).
16. In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England controls the queue:
In West Germany the Federal Department of Commerce
is in charge of domestic issues. In France, new issues must
be cleared with the Treasury. And in Switzerland there is
an official Issues Committee. See Maycock (1983, p. 5),
Dufey and Krishnan (1983, p. iLk),Aftalionand Bompaire (1983,
p. 3), and Corti (1983, p.39).
/ZVan Agtmael (1983, p. 5) notes, we believe incorrectly, that
no queuing exists in the Eurobond market. Compare Fisher
(1981, p. 20).
/9.See Mendelsohn (1983, p. 10), Dufey andKrishnan(1983, p. 15),
Corti (1983, p. 3) aridWymeersch(1983).
/9.A bought deal is a pre-underwritten issue, offered to a borrower
on a take-it-or-1eave-it basis, which is valid for a specified
short time period. Bought deals have been offered and 'closed
out within 224. hours. See Fisher (1981, p.83), and Shirreff
(1981, p. 31).
2o. For the view that Eurobond selling concessions arerelatively
high, see Fisher (1981, p. 81), Mendelsohn (1980, p. 1824.) arid
Mendelsohn(1983, pp. 13-19).
21.The differential has reached100basis points or higher for some
issuers. SeeKarp(1982)and Mendelsohn (1983).
22. Mendelsohn (1980, p.136) citing World Bank records.-62-
23. Fisher (1981, P. 19).
24. Mendelsohn (1983, p. 5).
25. Mendelsohn (1983, p. 5).
26. Fisher (1981, p. 19).
27. Mendelsohn (1983, p. 15). The purchase is made by the lead
manager as agent for the underwriting syndicate in order
to avoid double taxation.
28. Fisher (1981, p. 77) notes that underwriters are rarely mailed
copies of the subscription agreement prior to closing, and
so they must have trust in the management group. See also
Mendelsohn (1983, p. 16).
29. Mendelsohn (1980, p. 183).
30. Fisher (1981, p. 80).
31. This is the general view expressed by Fisher (1981, P. 80).
In the Deutsche mark segment of the market, the major German
issuing banks monitor early trading closely to identify banks
that break ranks. See Tim Anderson, "Germany's Exclusive
Club," Euromoney, May 1983b, pp. 50-2.
32. Grey market prices first appeared on the Reuters Monitor in
August 1982, although telephone prices were circulated earlier.
Tim Anderson, "Clearing the Grey Clouds," Euromoney, May l983a,
pp. 26-8, and private interviews.
33.Seefor example AGEFI international Financial Review, London:
AGEFI Press Limited.
34. Large institutions buying for trust accounts need not pass
along these gains, a problem we explore in Section IV.
35.Inthe Eurobond market, there is no Papilsky Rule compelling
sellers to charge the same price to all buyers as there is in the
US. market. See Mendelsohri (1983, :],6).:
36. Fisher (1981, p. 38) notes that estimated ratings based on
comparison with similar domes±ic securities are often reported.
37. Fisher (1981, p. 60).
38. Fisher (1981, p. 81).
39. See Shirreff (1981).
40. See Fisher (1981, pp. 83-6) and Fisher, "Imagination Wins
Again," Euromoney, February l98l,pp. 125-8 for details.-63-.
4.1.In 1980, the principal amount of dollar Floating Rate Notes
totalled $4.0 billion or 31.5% of all Eurodollar issues, up
from $1.1 billion and 12.7% in 1976. See Fisher (1981, p. 103).
42. At the end of 1980, Euro-clear had 123 shareholders and serviced
1,080 member banks. Cedel had 924. shareholders with 1,050
member banks. Fisher (1981, p. 182).
43. Tim Anderson,"The Growing War Between Cedel and Euroclear,"
Euromoney, February 198lb, p. 35.
4.4. Mendelsohn (1980, p. 61) displays a deep reverence for he
Eurobond market exclaiming, "It saved the industrialized
world from an even deeper recession (in the 1970s) than it
actually suffered and allowed many industrial countries
to maintain an almost unchecked economic expansion."
45. Mendelsohn (1980, p. 47).
46. Mendelsohn (1983, p.11) cites Fisher (1979) claiming that by mid—1976 there
had been 19 defaults totaling more than $300 million. A recent case alleges
that a trader from Bear, Sterns (New York) and another from Union Bank of
Switzerland engaged in fraudulent trading, defrauding both companies of $8.3
million. The case raises the issue of whether the incident reflects an iso-
lated case resulting from poor internal controls, or whether the market's
general lack of regulation is at fault. The resolution of this dispute,
with its third party implications, is an important challenge for the
Association of International Bond Dealers's arbitration procedures. See
"Bear—Faced Fraud," The Economist, July 14, 1984, pp. 72—3.
47. See "Are the Eurobond Markets Incestuous?"
November 1977, pp. 46-7.
48. Mendelsohn (l90, pp. 185190) shows that in a typical Euro-
bond underwriting ($45 million for 9 years with spread
totaling 2.5%), the lead manager and comanagers (If any) will claim
half of the fees. The underwriting group (about 90) would
share about 38% of the fees, and the selling group (perhaps
100) would share about 12% of the fees. Mendelsohn draws the
conclusion that most members of the syndicate do not expect
profits from their activity. This, of course, presupposes that
the entire issue is sold at the offering price -—i.e.,that
the full 2% is earned --whichmay well not be true.
49. Koenig (l983b, p. 174).
50. one, "How the Citicorp Issue Rocked the Euromarkets,"
November 1977, p. 14.
51. Tim Anderson, "Optimism Shyly Creeps Back to the Bond Narkets,"
Euromoney, May 198lc, p. 46.
52. Gerard Engel, "Underwriters Need to Know Where They Stand,"
Euromoney, May 1983, p. 24.
53. Ibid.
54.Koenig, "Why Trading is Fun Again,' InstitutionalInvestor,
May1983b, p. 172.
55. Koenig, "The Great Liquidity Debate," Institutional Investor,
May 1983a, p. 158-9.—64—
56.Mendelsohn (1983, p.14)
57. In any market setting, one expects to observe agents taking steps to protect
their interests ——sellerslimit their product claims, buyers search out
product information, and so forth. As we have noted, participants in the
Euro—bond market have likewise developed effective mechanisms to protect
themselves from loss.
58. Mendelsohn (1980, p. 174) and Mendelsohn (1983, p. 21).
59. For more on secrecy in banking, see Walter (1983) and Walter (1985).
60. Fisher (1981, pp. 183—4).
61. Mendelsohn (1980, p. 195). See the Weekly Eurobond Guide for a listing of
AIBD secondary market makers.
62.Seefor example, Tim Anderson, "Hambro, Hamburg and the Social Ciub,H
Eurornoney, May 1981a, pp. 31-3 and Tim Anderson, "Optimism Shyly Creeps Back
to the Bond Market," Euromoney, May 1981c, pp. 45—8.
63. See Tim Anderson, "Hambro, Hamburg and the Social Club," Euromoney, May
1981a, p.33. However, concerning recently alleged fraudulent trading (see
footnote 46), The Economist (July 14, 1984, p.72) has commented that
"Self—regulation in such a market relies heavily on the probity and
vigilance of its members, but when they fail a strong watchdog is needed.
The AIBO is neither strong nor a watchdog."
64. See for example, David Sherreff and Sarah Martin, "Milestone
Deals in theEuromarkets," Eurornoriey, October1981, pp. 269-75.
65. See Karp (1982, PP. 134-5)fora discussion of how several
major underwriting firmswerecaught in May 1982 when expecta-
tions of U.S. budget deficit relief led them to believe that
interest rates would drop.
66. Floating Rate Notes in the Euromarket have proved to be a
major success. Money managers have been drawn to these in-
struments because of yield (typically the six-month LIBOR
rate +*%)and liquidity has improved so that the bid-ask
spread is only 5 basis points (compared to 25 basis points
on the most active fixed-coupon Eurobond). See Carl Gewirtz,
"Eurobonds," International Herald Tribune, October 31, 1983a.
During 1983, the overwhelming percentage of Eurodollar bonds
were reported to be classic straight issues, without sweeteners
of any sort. See Carl Gewirtz, "Decline in Eurobond Activity
Tied to Drop in Dollar Issues," International Herald Tribune,
November 29, 1983b. : -
67."Universal banking" is the term generally used, but may be a
poor choice since some readers will associate it primarily
with German banks which are allowedto perform almost any
financial service. For the moment, we ignore the important
distinction as to whether the commercial and investment banking
activities take place th legally separate subsidiaries of a
bank holding company or simply in separate departments of a
single bank.
68. Wyrneersch (1983,p.45).-65--
69. The extent of official guidance has been relaxed recently.
See Allen (1983) and Sakakibara (1984).
70. Concentration in the United States may be artificially low
because of the ban on interstate banking. But note also that
the concentration ratios in Europe represent 3-5 banks.
71. TheU.S. and Canadian dollar segments ofthe market are least
subjectto governmental regulations.See the discussion
inSectiãn II.
72. The U.S. OFDI controls in the 1960s were a keyfeature that
ledto the Euro-bond market, while the lET divertedforeign borrowers
fromthe U.S. as well. However, since entry into the Euro-
bond market was never restricted, we expect to see the elimination
of any excess profits that might have arisen from these distortions.
73.Seethe accompanying paper by Saunders on the conflict of
interest question.
74.Seethe accompanying paper by Pugel and White.
75.Thispoint is developed further the accompanying paper by
Saunders.
76.The term is used by Hayes (1979, p. 170).
77. Hayes (1979, p. 156) cites the Exxon "Dutch auctions," cor-
porate dividend reinvestment plans and stock-for-stock cor-
porate mergers as three examples.
78. It appears that large U.S. corporations are monitoring very
closely both U.S. and Euro-bond market conditions. Exxon
devised an issue which it was prepared to launch in either
market. See Karp (1982, p. 135).
79. On February 1, 1984, the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation
became the first U.S. State agency to offer securities to the
Euromarket. To complete the $100 million, 10-year issue,
the agency was required to establish an overseas financing
corporation in the Netherlands Aptilles. See "Alaska to
Offer First Eurobonds," International Herald Tribune, January 11, 1984.pp. 26—7.
"Germany's Exclusive Club," Euromoney, May 1983b,
-66-
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